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Abstract. Within the European Union order, the national states play a very important role. 
They are responsible for the enforcement and the control of the execution of the policies of the 
European Communities. Although the European Union has a central administration, she doesn’t have 
external agencies. Applying the European instructions and regulations depends on the national 
governments. Because of rules such as mutual recognition, each government depends on the quality of 
executing the Community policy, for the purpose of achieving its own responsibilities. A spectre is 
haunting the national states – the spectre of globalization. That’s way we will focus in this paper on the 
national state on its dynamism and existence in a united Europe. 
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Europe dissolves when we want to see it clearly and distinctly; it comes to 
pieces when one wants to grasp its unity. If we try to find a founding origin or a non-
transmissible originality, we discover that, at first, Europe didn’t have anything 
specific and that today it doesn’t own anything exclusively. The notion of Europe 
should be thought of in terms of a total, multiple complexities. Europe is 
characterized by unity only in and through its multiplicity. The interactions among 
peoples, cultures, classes, states wove a unity which is it pluralistic and 
contradictory. Modern Europe constituted itself in a chaos of genesis in which 
powers of order, disorder and organization were knotted together. Europe didn’t 
live, until the beginning of the 20th century, but in divisions, antagonisms and 
conflicts which, in a certain way, created and perpetrated it.1 
Thinking of Europe, we had to rethink the state and its institutions. 
Understanding the European phenomenon is essential to the direction of the national 
political and administrative decisional process. Even if Kelsen argued that “the State 
is not the entire juridical order: neither the pre-state juridical order of primitive 
societies, nor the supra-state or inter-state international juridical order, represent a 
State”2, in all the countries and in all the cultures, people refer to knowledge and 
                                                          
1
 Morin, Edgar, Gândind Europa, Editura Trei, 2002, p. 27. 
2
 Kelsen, Hans, Theorie pure du droit, Bruylant, L.G.D.J., 1999, p. 281. 
JURIDICA 
 
169 
 
traditions regarding the state: what it is, what it does and what it should be1. 
Relating to the above-mentioned issues we should refer to the State, the one 
who fights for power but ends up lost in it. The state is an abstraction; it is the 
cluster of political institutions whose specificity is the organization of domination, in 
the name of the common interest, on a certain territory. The State is represented by 
“us” – the governed, but, most of the times, it only represents “them” – the 
governing. 
 
1. The permanence of the dynamism of the state 
The dynamism of the state has been highlighted by the different doctrinaire 
trends of the times which gave birth to schools of state and law, since the very 
foundation of the city-state in Ancient Greece and up to the present day, when we 
speak of the rule of law. Interestingly enough, each of these schools set out to 
promote its own theory by denying or supporting what was before. Thus, speaking 
of the state, and not only (also about law), we found it necessary to start with the 
study of the antiquity, because this is the source and the origin of the whole 
European development. Even though the society we are living in today does no 
longer resemble the society of those times, and the institutions which govern us are 
completely different, the founding principles, the universally valid ideas which 
govern our existence stem from what the philosophers of those times (Lycurg, 
Solon, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, St. Augustine and d’Aquino) argued. 
At the end of the Middle Ages and beginning of modern times, modern 
science was founded. It was also then when the conception of the public law was 
laid down, on the basis of the abstract concept of a “homo politicus”, the perfect man 
who has perfect knowledge about all the needs of society, who has an ideal morality, 
who is the holder of law and who has to take part in the actual ruling of the state. 
If the antiquity focuses on the collectivity, regarding the man as a mere means 
for the collectivity’s ends, for the modernity, it is man who is the end. The genuine 
orientation towards self-knowledge starts with Descartes, with his famous saying 
“cogito ergo sum” (I think, therefore I am), which points to the human reason and 
has the aim of placing man in the centre of the whole universe. 
“All the states which have, or had, power over people were or are either 
republics or principalities.”2 With these words, Machiavelli became the initiator of a 
new way of regarding politics and the state. It was, however, the school of natural 
law that conceived a natural, free and equal man and described this natural condition 
as being contrary to the historic law. Man escaped this condition through the social 
contract, creating the state.3 Giving up their natural rights in favour of the State 
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 Edelman, Murray, Politica şi utilizarea simbolurilor, Bucureşti, Polirom, 1999, p. 11. 
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 Braunstein-Silvestre, Florence, Jean Francois, Pepin, Marile Doctrine – Politică, economie, religie, 
Editura Antet, p. 34. 
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which protects them, people, and the whole society, entrust their sovereignty to the 
state. People do not preserve any right or any personal will for themselves, after 
renouncing at the exercise of its sovereignty, which is thus entrusted to the State 
once and for all. The State, represented by the sovereign, has no obligation to the 
people; the contract concluded between them does not affect the sovereign, as there 
is no contract between the people and the sovereign. 
It is because of that that Kant’s freedom is grounded on moral deeds. Even 
though law is based on reason, it can’t spread its sphere of influence over the purely 
internal acts, the latter remaining outside the juridical regulations. In fact, one may 
notice that the juridical development of a society is always varied, but it presupposes 
a unitary internal logic of the institutions, determined by the conditions of the 
juridical conscience themselves. When the subject “thinks” of himself, he must think 
of himself as a possible object for a different subject, he can’t conceive of himself 
objectively as a possible thinking content for others.1 It was the Hegelian conception 
that had a strong influence on the whole thinking of its time and on the subsequent 
thinking, until today, emphasizing the need of studying social phenomena on an 
evolution scale, of connecting them with the past, of finding “der Geist”, the spirit of 
this evolution.2 The acknowledgement of the importance of the historic school of 
law is not only due to this trend – Hegelian, Cicero himself proclaimed “historia 
magistra vitae”, and even Montesquieu asserted that “les lois sont les rapports 
necessaries qui dérivent de la nature de choses”. 
Structuralism, seen as a revolution in the field of social sciences, in the sense 
that it provides the instrument of scientific precision on mathematical bases; is 
followed by utilitarianism, which moves from the analysis of justice to the analysis 
of the useful, which confers the state and law the role of ensuring the balance 
between the private interests and the interest of the community. Again, positivism 
represents an attempt to reorganize society on practical, rather than speculative, 
grounds, therefore a breaking off from the social organization in the Middle Ages 
and from that in the modern times. 
The movement which led to the assertion of the human individuality is known 
as the liberal trend. Liberals support the restriction of the interfering power of the 
state with the aim of preserving the individual rights and liberties. Stemming from 
liberalism, the idea of the rule of law became a formal principle which designated 
the totality of the procedures for generating law. Thus, even though for Kelsen the 
rule of law is a pleonasm, any law is law of the state, and any state is a state of law, 
it becomes a constraining order, an order which justified the police state. 
However, the juridical literature constantly emphasized that the notion of the 
Rule of law has its own universal dimension, as it was expressly attested in many 
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international and European documents1. The existence of the rule of law essentially 
depends on the national realities, those which contributed to the definition and 
establishment of the rule of law as a basic concept of the existence of the modern 
state. 
One of history’s most fascinating phenomena is considered to be the tension 
between continuity and discontinuity, without which continuity might be 
misunderstood as an ordinary identity: continuity consists in transforming the 
inherited factors and traditions. Any change, especially in the more complex 
societies, is only possible through contracts and exchange of experience, methods 
and ideas. Such initiatives don’t appear in isolation or, even if they do, they are 
diminished and delayed. The tension of continuity and discontinuity is the one which 
gave birth to a new identity. As of now, the rule of law is no longer only a necessity, 
but it becomes an element of the society, a reality, a model of the existence of the 
national state. The ascent of the national state, with its capacity to guarantee order, 
security, law and the right to property, was the one which made the advent of the 
modern world possible. 
 
2. The state within the state 
Once the continuity of the concept of state established, in the field doctrine, as 
well as in the doctrine of the concept of the national state, in the historic evolution of 
Europe, we found it appropriate to look at the different forms of its manifestation. 
States have multiple functions, be they positive or negative: the same coercive 
power which enables them to protect the right of property and to guarantee public 
safety also enables them to coercively execute private property and to infringe 
citizens’ rights. The monopoly of the legitimate power exercised by the state enables 
individuals to escape from what Hobbes called “each individual’s war against all the 
others”. 
The state is the institutionalized form of political power. Starting with the 15th 
century, it came to be considered by the society as an instrument of asserting its 
sovereignty both internally and externally. The form of the state is one of the oldest 
concepts coming from the study of the state in general, and of the state organization 
and leadership, in particular.2 The form of the state is analyzed according to three 
aspects: the form of the structure of the state; the government form and the political 
regime. Though distinct, the three aspects are closely connected. 
From a conceptual point of view, the structure of the state represents the way 
in which power is organized in relation with the territory of the state. In the 
constitutional doctrine, it is unanimously accepted that, from the point of view of the 
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 The European Convention of Human Rights, the EU Treaties etc. 
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 See the development of the political - juridical conceptions about the form of the state in Ceterchi, 
Ioan, Luburici, Momcilo, Teoria generală a statului şi dreptului, Universitatea Bucureşti, Facultatea de 
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state structure, states can be classified into: unitary states and compound states, even 
if in reality there are particular forms of the types mentioned above. The government 
form is a juridical, as well as a political, concept which indicates the nature of the 
body which has the function of head of state: president, monarch – king, emperor, 
Directorate, State Council, Council of the revolution, Federal Council etc. It also 
indicates the way in which supreme bodies are organized and function and it is 
generally related to the defining features of the head of state and to his relations with 
the legislating power. In terms of the government form, states can be classified into 
republics and monarchies. The traditional classification of the political regimes has 
known since Aristotle numerous variants which, however, haven’t brought 
significant changes, so that the number of holders of power still remains, for many 
actors, a valid criterion.1 Thus, the political regime is either the form of the 
relationship between the governed and the governing in a society, or the totality of 
the constitutional rules, or a number of mechanisms which distribute power among 
the different bodies and fix their way of relating to each other. 
The artisan of the theory of the separation of powers within the state, 
Montesquieu, conceived of the state only in as much as it entrusted its power to 
distinct bodies, consisting in the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Rapidly, 
this theory became a sort of a dogma which was contained in the Constitutions of the 
time and especially in the 1789 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Even 
though the great majority of the European states consented in their legal regulations 
to this principle, the everyday experience brought us at present to an inversion of 
Montesquieu’s “hierarchy”. The executive power has become, progressively, the 
centre of the decision-making, legislative process, to the detriment of the legislative 
power, while the judicial power has become a mere authority. In reality, and not 
only in Romania, but also in most European states, the legislative power was 
transformed, its capacity to legislate passed “in the hands” of the executive bodies 
(both the head of the state and the government) – a situation which is specific to the 
parliamentary and semi-presidential republics. Moreover, in the circumstances of the 
promotion of excessive decentralization, of the transfer of competences to the local 
authorities and of the integration of states into supra-national unions, parliaments 
have begun a new stage of their evolution. 
The complex content of the rule of law and of the role of the law within the 
former includes the value dimension, as law is the product of the social facts and of 
the human will, a cluster of moral values and a normative order, a cluster of acts of 
will and acts of authority, freedom and constraint.2 
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 This criterion is used by Prelot, Marcel, Boulouis, Jean, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel, 
Paris, Dalloz, 1987, who distinguishes among democracies, monocracies, oligarchies and mixed 
regimes, or in Debbasch, Charles, Bourdon, Jacques, Pontier, Jean-Marie, Ricci, Jean-Claude, Droit 
constitutionnel et institutions politiques, Paris, Economica, 1983; according to them, there are two main 
types of political regimes: democracy and the other regimes.  
2
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Thus, for a democratic society to function, beyond such aspects as the 
existence of the market economy, of a significantly numerous middle class, of the 
professionalization of the political elite, a cultural component is also needed. This 
component, called by certain researchers the “civilizing competence”1, becomes a 
precondition of the integration into the contemporary world. In this sense, one can 
argue that no social union should claim cultural uniformization, but, rather, a 
thorough uniformization of the opportunities of culturalizing for each individual and 
for the community. The principle of “democratic centralism” was abandoned in 
favour of devolving and decentralizing of the political power which is to be 
exercised under the rule of law; the rejection of the principle of unity involved the 
emergence of distinct, local spheres. “The symphony of the divergent notes” of the 
local communities was long ignored by the leaders of the state because they 
considered that the distributive character of power affects the authority of the 
Centre. Basically, Lucian Blaga’s despair when he realized that “we have a new 
religion, but we cannot find anywhere a God for it”2 concentrates the drama of these 
times. 
Local autonomy, especially in a unitary state, cannot be conceived of but 
within certain limits. These limits are inherent, some of them having an objective 
economic determination, others being determined by political considerations. It is 
unconceivable in a state of law that the law, the authority of the executive or of 
justice should be infringed on the grounds of local autonomy. Local autonomy 
cannot be achieved but within the principles of the rule of law, the principle of local 
autonomy itself being one of them. Hence, the organic tie which has to exist 
between local autonomy and the law, between local interests and the national 
interests expressed by the law. This explains why there is a representative of the 
state3, more exactly of the central executive, with the role of overseeing the 
enforcement of the law by the local authorities, including those of the autonomous 
communities. 
The concept of “unified” or “homogeneous” state authority (in which the local 
authorities act as representatives of the central government, equivocally 
subordinated to its directive and control) was rejected and replaced with a dual 
system, in which the state and the local management act each in its own sphere of 
influence. The modern society, characterized by contradictions and pluralism, 
involves a great variety of social behaviours. That is why making decisions at the 
central level is not enough, but it is necessary for adapting them to the local 
specificity. 
                                                          
1
 Piotr Sztompka, Competenţa civilizatoare: condiţie prealabilă a tranziţiei post-comuniste, în 
Sociologie Românească, nr. 3/1993, p. 262. 
2
 Quotation taken from Teodorescu, Gheorghe, Putere, autoritate şi comunicare politică, Bucureşti, 
Editura Nemira, 2000, p. 63. 
3
 Constantinescu, M., Iorgovan, A., Muraru, I., Tănăsescu, E.S., Constituţia României revizuită – 
comentarii şi explicaţii, Bucureşti, Editura All Beck, 2004, p. 261. 
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The decentralization characteristic to the subsidiary state enables the 
achievement in better conditions of social justice, develops the solidarity, ensures 
the appropriation of the decision by the place in which it takes effect, and the citizen, 
who should be informed in advance, will be directly involved in the decision making 
process and, implicitly, in the effective participation in solving public interest 
problems. Europe is a space of decentralized local communities, the emphasis being 
placed on decentralization to enable the development of contacts which the hyper-
centralized state wouldn’t have promoted and couldn’t have tolerated. We can argue 
that decentralization is one of the ways which lead to a sort of European “normality” 
and that it participates in achieving this goal. Thus, the actual context is quite 
favourable to diminishing the role of the state, which should focus on its major 
functions: diplomacy, defence, monetary policy, preserving the economic macro-
balance etc., those which stem directly from the national sovereignty, which only the 
state holds, no matter if it is a unitary or federal state. 
 
3. The European paradigm 
The consolidation of the national state and in particularly the administrative 
capacity finally leads to what is called “good governance”. This term should be 
understood as capacity to govern, which is strictly dependent on the administrative 
capacity of the state, which itself is the means of achieving the governmental 
policies. We notice that within the system of the democratic state there is a clear 
circular relation between citizen/society – administration – government/state – the 
E.U. Taking this relational system into consideration, we will notice that the poor 
developing capacity of an actor will have an influence over the others and finally 
over the entire EU member states.  
Obviously, today, more than ever, it is necessary to listen and explain, to re-
establish the natural communication among social groups in order to make them 
accountable. The personal activity of the society members, no matter who they are, 
should no longer be considered an unimportant act for the society as a whole or as 
an act subordinated to the society, but it should regain the intrinsic value of the 
personal engagement. 
Such as any institution constitutes the product of a series of historic events 
and reflects the beliefs, hopes and preoccupations of those who played an essential 
role in its foundation. The European Communities are no exception to this rule. 
The present configuration of the European Union is the outcome of the effort 
of cooperation, which started more than half a century ago, in the attempt to 
reconstruct a continent destroyed by war and to lay the grounds of a safe and 
prosperous society. Since then, the cooperation has extended to many fields, the 
European Union offering now a forum of debate and problem solving. 
We can say that the European Union is a success story of political, economic, 
institutional, cultural harmonization. The concept of integration “tore” the 
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coexistence of the states “horizontally”, attributing a vertical dimension to the 
relationships among them. The traditional conception that the sovereignty of the 
states is inviolable and indivisible becomes less consistent faced with the beliefs that 
the imperfections of human and political cohabitation, the insufficiencies of the 
nation-state system and the power abuses of some states over others, could be 
surpassed only if the national sovereignties “merged” into a common sovereignty 
and if this grouped at a superior level, making up a supra-national community. The 
result of this would be the existence of a supra-national European organization, in 
which the Community authorities, respecting the identity and the national 
peculiarities of the peoples grouped in the respective organization, would be those to 
lead the destiny of the citizens of the member states. This could be a federation, a 
special federation of nation-states. 
The European Union is the result of such an integrating concept, requiring, 
however, an adaptation determined by the “inertia” of the member states in the 
problem of the national sovereignty. More precisely, the member states do not wish 
to give up their structure as a national state1 so easily in favour of a state or of a 
federal-type Union. A compromise was necessary, through which, without pursuing 
the creation of a classic European federal state, the achievement of “something 
more” than the simple “horizontal cooperation” between the member states should 
be ensured. The original solution was great and, at the same time, simple: 
overcoming, step by step, the contradiction between the preservation of the 
independence of the national states and the final goal of creating a European federal 
state or a federal-type political union. Western Europe acknowledged the flaws of 
the national theory, which dominated a long while and moved, economically, 
politically, but also culturally, to a new paradigm, which integrates the 
interrogations, even the “national” ones, through their origin, sphere and 
significance, into a European approach. The national horizon is circumscribed 
within the larger, but increasingly less abstract, of our continent. 
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